2,834 results match your criteria Behavioral And Brain Sciences[Journal]


Culture and the plasticity of perception.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e107. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Anthropology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305-2034.

Culture shapes our basic sensory experience of the world. This is particularly striking in the study of religion and psychosis, where we and others have shown that cultural context determines both the structure and content of hallucination-like events. The cultural shaping of hallucinations may provide a rich case-study for linking cultural learning with emerging prediction-based models of perception. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002887DOI Listing

Integrating models of cognition and culture will require a bit more math.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e119. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Cognitive and Information Sciences, University of California, Merced, Merced, CA95343.

We support the goal to integrate models of culture and cognition. However, we are not convinced that the free energy principle and Thinking Through Other Minds will be useful in achieving it. There are long traditions of modeling both cultural evolution and cognition. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1900267XDOI Listing

Have we lost the thinker in other minds? Human thinking beyond social norms.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e94. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Psychology, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montreal, QuebecH3C 3P8, Canada.

Veissière and colleagues suggest that thinking is entirely based on social norms. I point out that despite the fact that social norms are commonly used to alleviate cognitive processing, some individuals are willing and able to go about the costly process of questioning them and exploring other valuable ways of thinking. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002875DOI Listing

A unified account of culture should accommodate animal cultures.

Authors:
Andrew Whiten

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e118. Epub 2020 May 28.

Centre for Social Learning and Cognitive Evolution, School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St AndrewsKY16 9JP, UK.

Discoveries about social learning and culture in non-human animals have burgeoned this century, yet despite aspiring to offer a unified account of culture, the target article neglects these discoveries almost totally. I offer an overview of principal findings in this field including phylogenetic reach, intraspecies pervasiveness, stability, fidelity, and attentional funnelling in social learning. Can the authors' approach accommodate these? Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1900270XDOI Listing

A deeper and distributed search for culture.

Authors:
Paul S Strand

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e115. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Psychology, Washington State University Tri-Cities, Richland,

The target article does not address the neural mediation of complex social behavior. I review evidence that such mediation may be compatible with proposed Bayesian information-processing principles. Notably, however, such mediation occurs subcortically as well as cortically, concerns reward uncertainty and information uncertainty, and impacts culture via group-level payoff structures that define individualism and collectivism. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002693DOI Listing

Digital life, a theory of minds, and mapping human and machine cultural universals.

Authors:
Kevin B Clark

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e98. Epub 2020 May 28.

Research and Development Service, Veterans Affairs Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System, Los Angeles, CA90073.

Emerging cybertechnologies, such as social digibots, bend epistemological conventions of life and culture already complicated by human and animal relationships. Virtually-augmented niches of machines and organic life promise new free-energy-governed selection of intelligent digital life. These provocative eco-evolutionary contexts demand a theory of (natural and artificial) minds to characterize and validate the immersive social phenomena universally-shaping cultural affordances. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002838DOI Listing

Social epistemic actions.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e113. Epub 2020 May 28.

Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council, Rome 00185, Italy.

We consider the ways humans engage in social epistemic actions, to guide each other's attention, prediction, and learning processes towards salient information, at the timescale of online social interaction and joint action. This parallels the active guidance of other's attention, prediction, and learning processes at the longer timescale of niche construction and cultural practices, as discussed in the target article. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002802DOI Listing

TTOM in action: Refining the variational approach to cognition and culture.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e120. Epub 2020 May 28.

Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, CanadaH3A 1A1.

The target article "Thinking Through Other Minds" (TTOM) offered an account of the distinctively human capacity to acquire cultural knowledge, norms, and practices. To this end, we leveraged recent ideas from theoretical neurobiology to understand the human mind in social and cultural contexts. Our aim was both synthetic - building an integrative model adequate to account for key features of cultural learning and adaptation; and prescriptive - showing how the tools developed to explain brain dynamics can be applied to the emergence of social and cultural ecologies of mind. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X20000011DOI Listing

"Through others we become ourselves": The dialectics of predictive coding and active inference.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e93. Epub 2020 May 28.

Independent Max Planck Research Group for Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry, 80804Munich-Schwabing, Germany.

Thinking through other minds creatively situates the free-energy principle within real-life cultural processes, thereby enriching both sociocultural theories and Bayesian accounts of cognition. Here, shifting the attention from thinking-through to becoming-with, we suggest complementing such an account by focusing on the empirical, computational, and conceptual investigation of the multiscale dynamics of social interaction. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002917DOI Listing

The dark side of thinking through other minds.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e116. Epub 2020 May 28.

Center Leo Apostel, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium.

We show that TTOM has a lot to offer for the study of the evolution of cultures, but that this also brings to the fore the dark implications of TTOM, unexposed in Veissière et al. Those implications lead us to move beyond meme-centered or an organism-centered concept of fitness based on free-energy minimization, toward a social system-centered view. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002796DOI Listing

Encultured minds, not error reduction minds.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e109. Epub 2020 May 28.

The Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, 87-100Toruń, Poland.

There are serious theoretical problems with the free-energy principle model, which are shown in the current article. We discuss the proposed model's inability to account for culturally emergent normativities, and point out the foundational issues that we claim this inability stems from. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002826DOI Listing

Thinking through prior bodies: autonomic uncertainty and interoceptive self-inference.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e91. Epub 2020 May 28.

Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital, 8000Aarhus, Denmark.

The Bayesian brain hypothesis, as formalized by the free-energy principle, is ascendant in cognitive science. But, how does the Bayesian brain obtain prior beliefs? Veissière and colleagues argue that sociocultural interaction is one important source. We offer a complementary model in which "interoceptive self-inference" guides the estimation of expected uncertainty both in ourselves and in our social conspecifics. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002899DOI Listing

Normativity, social change, and the epistemological framing of culture.

Authors:
Andrew Buskell

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e96. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, CambridgeCB2 3RH, UK.

The authors deploy an epistemic framework to represent culture and model the acquisition of cultural behavior. Yet, the framing inherits familiar problems with explaining the acquisition of norms. Such problems are conspicuous with regard to human societies where norms are ubiquitous. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002681DOI Listing

Skill-based engagement with a rich landscape of affordances as an alternative to thinking through other minds.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e106. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Psychiatry, Amsterdam University Medical Centre, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Veissière and colleagues make a valiant attempt at reconciling an internalist account of implicit cultural learning with an externalist account that understands social behaviour in terms of its environment-involving dynamics. However, unfortunately the author's attempt to forge a middle way between internalism and externalism fails. We argue their failure stems from the overly individualistic understanding of the perception of cultural affordances they propose. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1900284XDOI Listing

Unification at the cost of realism and precision.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e95. Epub 2020 May 28.

School of Philosophy, the Australian National University, Canberra, 0200ACT, Australia.

Veissière et al. must sacrifice explanatory realism and precision in order to develop a unified formal model. Drawing on examples from cognitive archeology, we argue that this makes it difficult for them to derive the kinds of testable predictions that would allow them to resolve debates over the nature of human social cognition and cultural acquisition. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002760DOI Listing

The role of communication in acquisition, curation, and transmission of culture.

Authors:
Hyowon Gweon

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e104. Epub 2020 May 28.

Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305.

Veissière et al.'s proposal aims to explain how cognition enables cultural learning, but fails to acknowledge a distinctively human behavior critical to this process: communication. Recent advances in developmental and computational cognitive science suggest that the social-cognitive capacities central to TTOM also support sophisticated yet remarkably early-emerging inferences and communicative behaviors that allow us to learn and share abstract knowledge. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002863DOI Listing

Thinking through others' emotions: Incorporating the role of emotional state inference in thinking through other minds.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e114. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Psychiatry, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ85724.

The active inference framework offers an attractive starting point for understanding cultural cognition. Here, we argue that affective dynamics are essential to include when constructing this type of theory. We highlight ways in which interactions between emotional responses and the perception of those responses, both within and between individuals, can play central roles in both motivating and constraining sociocultural practices. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002644DOI Listing

"Social physiology" for psychiatric semiology: How TTOM can initiate an interactive turn for computational psychiatry?

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e102. Epub 2020 May 28.

Services d'explorations fonctionnelles du système nerveux, Clinique du sommeil, CHU de Bordeaux, 33076Bordeaux, France.

Thinking through other minds (TTOM) encompasses new dimensions in computational psychiatry: social interaction and mutual sense-making. It questions the nature of psychiatric manifestations (semiology) in light of recent data on social interaction in neuroscience. We propose the concept of "social physiology" in response to the call by the conceivers of TTOM for the renewal of computational psychiatry. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002735DOI Listing

The future of TTOM.

Authors:
Søren Overgaard

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e111. Epub 2020 May 28.

Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, DK-2300Copenhagen S, Denmark.

"Thinking through other minds," or TTOM, is defined in two different ways. On the one hand, it refers to something people do - for example, inferences they make about others' expectations. On the other hand, it refers to a particular theoretical model of those things that people do. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002668DOI Listing

Choosing a Markov blanket.

Authors:
Thomas Parr

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e112. Epub 2020 May 28.

Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University College London, LondonWC1N 3AR, UK.

This commentary focuses upon the relationship between two themes in the target article: the ways in which a Markov blanket may be defined and the role of precision and salience in mediating the interactions between what is internal and external to a system. These each rest upon the different perspectives we might take while "choosing" a Markov blanket. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002632DOI Listing

Enculturation without TTOM and Bayesianism without FEP: Another Bayesian theory of culture is needed.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e103. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Cognitive Studies, Institut Jean Nicod, EHESS/ENS/PSL University, 75005Paris, France.

First, I discuss cross-cultural evidence showing that a good deal of enculturation takes place outside of thinking through other minds. Second, I review evidence challenging the claim that humans seek to minimize entropy. Finally, I argue that optimality claims should be avoided, and that descriptive Bayesianism offers a more promising avenue for the development of a Bayesian theory of culture. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002905DOI Listing

How does social cognition shape enculturation?

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e108. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Philosophy, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6500 HD Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

Other people in our culture actively transform our behavioral dispositions and mental states by shaping them in various ways. In the following, we highlight three points which Veissière et al. may consider in leveraging their account to illuminate the dynamics by which this occurs, and in particular, to shed light on how social cognition supports, and is supported by, enculturation. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002814DOI Listing

Participating in a musician's stream of consciousness.

Authors:
Björn Vickhoff

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e117. Epub 2020 May 28.

Sahlgrenska Academy, University of Gothenburg, 413 90Göteborg, Sweden.

Do we acquire culture through other minds, or do we get access to other minds through culture? Music culture is a practice as well as the people involved. Sounding music works as a script guiding action, as do, to varying degrees, many rituals and customs. Collective co-performance of the script enables inter-subjectivity, which arguably contributes to the formation of subcultures. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002759DOI Listing

Maladaptive social norms, cultural progress, and the free-energy principle.

Authors:
Matteo Colombo

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e100. Epub 2020 May 28.

Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics, and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS), Tilburg University, 5000LETilburg, The Netherlands.

Veissière and collaborators ground their account of culture and social norms in the free-energy principle, which postulates that the utility (or adaptive value) of an outcome is equivalent to its probability. This equivalence would mean that their account entails that complying with social norms has always adaptive value. But, this is false, because many social norms are obviously maladaptive. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002723DOI Listing

The multicultural mind as an epistemological test and extension for the thinking through other minds approach.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e97. Epub 2020 May 28.

Department of Marketing, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong.

The multicultural experience (i.e., multicultural individuals and cross-cultural experiences) offers the intriguing possibility for (i) an empirical examination of how free-energy principles explain dynamic cultural behaviors and pragmatic cultural phenomena and (ii) a challenging but decisive test of thinking through other minds (TTOM) predictions. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002711DOI Listing

Thinking other minds.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e92. Epub 2020 May 28.

Departments of Philosophy and Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH45221.

We applaud the ambition of Veissière et al.'s account of cultural learning, and the attempt to ground higher order thinking in embodied theory. However, the account is limited by loose terminology, and by its commitment to a view of the child learner as inference-maker. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002747DOI Listing

Explaining or redefining mindreading?

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e101. Epub 2020 May 28.

Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA02155.

Veissière et al. disrupt current debates over the nature of mindreading by bringing multiple positions under the umbrella of free-energy. However, it is not clear whether integrating the opposing sides under a common formal framework will yield new insights into how mindreading is achieved, rather than offering a mere redescription of the target phenomenon. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002772DOI Listing

Importance of the "thinking through other minds" process explored through motor correlates of motivated social interactions.

Authors:
Harold Mouras

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e110. Epub 2020 May 28.

Laboratoire de Neurosciences Fonctionnelles et Pathologies (LNFP) EA 4559, Université de Picardie Jules Verne, Amiens, France.

We wanted to gather recent results supporting the idea of the central role of sharing agency in socioaffective and motivational information processing. Here, we want to support the idea that this process is quite arbitrary, early in the temporal chain of processes and not only influence the psychological, but also the motor correlates of socioaffective information processes. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002656DOI Listing

The cost of over-intellectualizing the free-energy principle.

Authors:
Daniel D Hutto

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e105. Epub 2020 May 28.

School of Liberal Arts, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, New South Wales2522, Australia.

This commentary raises a question about the target article's proposed explanation of what goes on when we think through other minds. It highlights a tension between non-mindreading characterizations of everyday social cognition and the individualist, cognitivist assumptions that target article's explanatory proposal inherits from the predictive processing framework it favours. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002851DOI Listing

Affective Social Learning serves as a quick and flexible complement to TTOM.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 28;43:e99. Epub 2020 May 28.

University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland.

Although we applaud the general aims of the target article, we argue that Affective Social Learning completes TTOM by pointing out how emotions can provide another route to acquiring culture, a route which may be quicker, more flexible, and even closer to an axiological definition of culture (less about what is, and more about what should be) than TTOM itself. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002784DOI Listing

Grounded procedures: A proximate mechanism for the psychology of cleansing and other physical actions.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 May 11:1-78. Epub 2020 May 11.

Department of Psychology, Mind & Society Center, and Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA90089, USA, https://dornsife.usc.edu/norbert-schwarz.

Experimental work has revealed causal links between physical cleansing and various psychological variables. Empirically, how robust are they? Theoretically, how do they operate? Major prevailing accounts focus on morality or disgust, capturing a subset of cleansing effects, but cannot easily handle cleansing effects in non-moral, non-disgusting contexts. Building on grounded views on cognitive processes and known properties of mental procedures, we propose grounded procedures of separation as a proximate mechanism underlying cleansing effects. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X20000308DOI Listing

Children's everyday moral conversation speaks to the emergence of obligation.

Authors:
Karen Bartsch

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e59. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Psychology Department, Wyoming University, Laramie, WY82071-3415.

For Tomasello's proposed ontology of the human sense of moral obligation, observations of early moral language may provide useful evidence complementary to that afforded by experimental research. Extant reports of children's everyday moral talk reveal patterns of participation and content that accord with the proposal and hint at extensions addressing individual differences. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002358DOI Listing

Who are "we" and why are we cooperating? Insights from social psychology.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e66. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT06520-8306.

Tomasello argues in the target article that a sense of moral obligation emerges from the creation of a collaborative "we" motivating us to fulfill our cooperative duties. We suggest that "we" takes many forms, entailing different obligations, depending on the type (and underlying functions) of the relationship(s) in question. We sketch a framework of such types, functions, and obligations to guide future research in our commentary. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002528DOI Listing

Is that all there is? Or is chimpanzees group hunt "fair" enough?

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e74. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, 5290002Israel.

Tomasello claims that we lack convincing evidence that nonhuman animals manifest a sense of moral obligation (i.e., the concept of fairness) in their group activities. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002309DOI Listing

The sense of obligation in children's testimonial learning.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e76. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN55436.

We extend Tomasello's discussion of children's developing sense of obligation to testimonial learning. First, we review a battery of behaviors in testimonial exchanges that parallel those described by Tomasello. Second, we explore the variable ways in which children hold others accountable, suggestive that children's evaluations of moral and epistemic responsibilities in joint collaborative activities are distinct. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002486DOI Listing

Obligation at zero acquaintance.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e69. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Institute for Sociology and Social Psychology, University at Cologne, 50931Köln, Germany.

Social obligation begins far before people establish explicit cooperative relationships. Research on trust suggests that people feel obligated to trust other people even at zero acquaintance, thus trusting complete strangers even though they privately expect to be exploited. Such obligations promote mutually beneficial behavior among strangers and likely help people build goodwill needed for more long-lasting relationships. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002498DOI Listing

Feelings of obligation are valuations of signaling-mediated social payoffs.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e85. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Psychology, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, N1G 2W1, Canada.

We extend Tomasello's framework by addressing the functional challenge of obligation. If the long-run social consequences of a decision are sufficiently costly, obligation motivates the actor to forgo potential immediate benefits in favor of long-term social interests. Thus, obligation psychology balances the downstream socially-mediated payoffs from a decision. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002322DOI Listing

Obligations without cooperation.

Authors:
Julia Marshall

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e79. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT06511.

Our sense of obligation is evident outside of joint collaborative activities. Most notably, children and adults recognize that parents are obligated to care for and love their children. This is presumably not because we think parents view their children as worthy cooperative partners, but because special obligations and duties are inherent in certain relational dynamics, namely the parent-child relationship. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002565DOI Listing

The many faces of obligation.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e89. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04103Leipzig, Germany.

My response to the commentaries focuses on four issues: (1) the diversity both within and between cultures of the many different faces of obligation; (2) the possible evolutionary roots of the sense of obligation, including possible sources that I did not consider; (3) the possible ontogenetic roots of the sense of obligation, including especially children's understanding of groups from a third-party perspective (rather than through participation, as in my account); and (4) the relation between philosophical accounts of normative phenomena in general - which are pitched as not totally empirical - and empirical accounts such as my own. I have tried to distinguish comments that argue for extensions of the theory from those that represent genuine disagreement. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002620DOI Listing

Shared Intentionality, joint commitment, and directed obligation.

Authors:
Margaret Gilbert

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e71. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, CA92697-4555.

Tomasello frequently refers to joint commitment, but does not fully characterize it. In earlier publications, I have offered a detailed account of joint commitment, tying it to a sense that the parties form a "we," and arguing that it grounds directed obligations and rights. Here I outline my understanding of joint commitment and its normative impact. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002619DOI Listing

Psychological consequences of the normativity of moral obligation.

Authors:
Stephen Darwall

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e68. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, CT06520-8306.

An adequate moral psychology of obligation must bear in mind that although the "sense of obligation" is psychological, what it is a sense of, moral obligation itself, is not. It is irreducibly normative. I argue, therefore, that the "we" whose demands the sense of obligation presupposes must be an ideal rather than an actual "we. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002437DOI Listing

Caregiving relationships as evolutionary and developmental bases of obligation.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e83. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI48109.

Obligation as defined by Tomasello requires mutually capable parties, but one-sided caregiver relationships reveal its developmental and evolutionary precursors. Specifically, "coercive" emotions may prompt protective action by caregivers toward infant primates, and infants show distress toward caregivers when they appear to violate expectations in their relationships. We argue that these early social-relational expectations and emotions may form the base of obligation. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002504DOI Listing

The joy of obligation: Human cultural worldviews can enhance the rewards of meeting obligations.

Authors:
Emma E Buchtel

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e63. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China.

Is it particularly human to feel coerced into fulfilling moral obligations, or is it particularly human to enjoy them? I argue for the importance of taking into account how culture promotes prosocial behavior, discussing how Confucian heritage culture enhances the satisfaction of meeting one's obligations. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002607DOI Listing

Obligations to whom, obligations to what? A philosophical perspective on the objects of our obligations.

Authors:
Kati Kish Bar-On

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e58. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

The Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv Yafo, Israel, 6997801.

Tomasello strives to understand the underlying psychology behind the human sense of obligation, but he only addresses a specific kind of obligation: to other human beings. We argue that in order to account for the psychological underpinning of human behavior, one should also consider people's sense of commitment to non-human entities, such as ideals, values, and moral principles. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002395DOI Listing

Does the concept of develop from the inside-out or outside-in?

Authors:
Marjorie Rhodes

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e84. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY10003.

Tomasello proposes that the concept of obligation develops "from the inside-out": emerging first in experiences of shared agency and generalizing outward to shape children's broader understanding. Here I consider that obligation may also develop "from the outside-in," emerging as a domain-specific instantiation of a more general conceptual bias to expect categories to prescribe how their members are supposed to behave. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002590DOI Listing

A lifelong preoccupation with the sociality of moral obligation.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e77. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Linguistics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA93106-3100.

Tomasello provides compelling evidence that children understand that people are morally obligated toward members of their social group. We call for expanding the scope of inquiry to encompass the full developmental trajectory of humans' understanding of the relation between moral obligation, sociality, and stancetaking in interaction. We suggest that humans display a lifelong preoccupation with the sociality of moral obligation. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X1900253XDOI Listing

Who are "we"? Dealing with conflicting moral obligations.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e86. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Hebrew University of Jerusalem, School of Business Administration and the Center for the Study of Rationality, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem9190501.

Satisfying one's obligations is an important part of being human. However, people's obligations can often prescribe contradictory behaviors. Moral obligations conflict (loyalty vs. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002577DOI Listing

Tomasello on "we" and the sense of obligation.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e62. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Philosophy Department, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305.

Tomasello explores four interrelated phenomena: (1) joint intentional collaboration; (2) joint commitment; (3) "self-regulative pressure from 'we'"; and (4) the sense of interpersonal obligation. He argues that the version of (1) that involves (2) is the "source" of (3) and so the source of (4). I note an issue that arises once we distinguish two versions of (3). Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002383DOI Listing

The divided we and multiple obligations.

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e70. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, LondonWC2A 2AEUnited Kingdom.

Tomasello's account of the origins and nature of moral obligation rightly emphasises the key roles of social relations and a cooperative sense of "we." However, we suggest that it overlooks the complexity of those social relations and the resulting prevalence of a divided "we" in moral social groups. We argue that the social identity dynamics that arise can lead to competing obligations in a single group, and this has implications for the evolution of obligation. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002553DOI Listing

The nature of obligation's special force.

Authors:
David Olbrich

Behav Brain Sci 2020 04 30;43:e80. Epub 2020 Apr 30.

Department of Philosophy, University College London, London, WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom.

Tomasello's characterization of obligation as demanding and coercive is not an implication of the centrality of collaborative commitment. Not only is this characterization contentious, it appears to be falsified in some cases of personal conviction. The theory would be strengthened if the nature of obligation's force and collaborative commitment were directly linked, possibly through Tomasello's notions of identity and identification. Read More

View Article

Download full-text PDF

Source
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19002450DOI Listing