8 results match your criteria American Journal Of Health Economics[Journal]

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Are Recessions Good for Staffing in Nursing Homes?

Am J Health Econ 2018 7;4(4):411-432. Epub 2018 Dec 7.

Division of General Internal Medicine and Leonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

The quality and cost of care in nursing homes depend critically on the number and types of nurses. Recent research suggests that the nursing supply adjusts to macroeconomic conditions. However, prior work has failed to consider the effect of macroeconomic conditions on demand for nurses through the effect on revenues. Read More

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ajhe_a_00110DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6328257PMC
December 2018

ADDRESSING THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: IS THERE A ROLE FOR PHYSICIAN EDUCATION?

Am J Health Econ 2018 17;4(3):383-410. Epub 2018 Aug 17.

Department of Economics, Center for Health and Wellbeing, 185A Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, and NBER.

Using national data on opioid prescriptions written by physicians from 2006 to 2014, we uncover a striking relationship between opioid prescribing and medical school rank. Even within the same specialty and practice location, physicians who completed their initial training at top medical schools write significantly fewer opioid prescriptions annually than physicians from lower ranked schools. Additional evidence suggests that some of this gradient represents a causal effect of education rather than patient selection across physicians or physician selection across medical schools. Read More

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ajhe_a_00113DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6258178PMC

Incentive Design and Quality Improvements: Evidence from State Medicaid Nursing Home Pay-for-Performance Programs.

Am J Health Econ 2018 23;4(1):105-130. Epub 2018 Jan 23.

Division of General Internal Medicine, University of Pennsylvania.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs have become a popular policy tool aimed at improving health care quality. We analyze how incentive design affects quality improvements in the nursing home setting, where several state Medicaid agencies have implemented P4P programs that vary in incentive structure. Using the Minimum Data Set and the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting data from 2001 to 2009, we examine how the weights put on various performance measures that are tied to P4P bonuses, such as clinical outcomes, inspection deficiencies, and staffing levels, affect improvements in those measures. Read More

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ajhe_a_00095DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5868417PMC
January 2018

DO YOU HAVE TO WIN IT TO FIX IT? A Longitudinal Study of Lottery Winners and Their Health-Care Demand.

Am J Health Econ 2018 23;4(1):26-50. Epub 2018 Jan 23.

London School of Economics.

We exploit lottery wins to investigate the effects of exogenous changes to individuals' income on the utilization of health care services, and the choice between private and public health care in the United Kingdom. Our empirical strategy focuses on lottery winners in an individual fixed effects framework and hence the variation of winnings arises from within-individual differences in small versus large winnings. The results indicate that lottery winners with larger wins are more likely to choose private health services than public health services from the National Health Service. Read More

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ajhe_a_00092DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5802355PMC
January 2018
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Tobacco Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis: How Should We Value Foregone Consumer Surplus?

Am J Health Econ 2018 23;4(1):1-25. Epub 2018 Jan 23.

University of Michigan, Department of Economics, 611 Tappan Ave, Ann Arbor MI 48109.

Recent tobacco regulations proposed by the Food and Drug Administration have raised a thorny question: how should the cost-benefit analysis accompanying such policies value foregone consumer surplus associated with regulation-induced reductions in smoking? In a model with rational and fully informed consumers, this question is straightforward. There is disagreement, however, about whether consumers are rational and fully informed, and the literature offers little practical guidance about what approach the FDA should use if they are not. In this paper, we outline the history of the FDA's recent attempts to regulate cigarettes and other tobacco products and how they have valued foregone consumer surplus in cost-benefit analyses. Read More

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ajhe_a_00091DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5796550PMC
January 2018

MEDICARE PAYMENTS AND SYSTEM-LEVEL HEALTH-CARE USE: The Spillover Effects of Medicare Managed Care.

Am J Health Econ 2015 16;1(4):399-431. Epub 2015 Oct 16.

Department of Economics, Brown University.

The rapid growth of Medicare managed care over the past decade has the potential to increase the efficiency of health-care delivery. Improvements in care management for some may improve efficiency system-wide, with implications for optimal payment policy in public insurance programs. These system-level effects may depend on local health-care market structure and vary based on patient characteristics. Read More

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http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/AJHE_a_00024
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/AJHE_a_00024DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4813814PMC
October 2015
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RISK CORRIDORS AND REINSURANCE IN HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACES: Insurance for Insurers.

Am J Health Econ 2016 ;2(1):66-95

Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public Health.

Health Insurance Marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act implement reinsurance and risk corridors. Reinsurance limits insurer costs associated with specific individuals, while risk corridors protect against aggregate losses. Both tighten the insurer's distribution of expected costs. Read More

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ajhe_a_00034DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4785828PMC
January 2016
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HOW MUCH FAVORABLE SELECTION IS LEFT IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE?

Am J Health Econ 2015 ;1(1):1-26

Harvard Medical School and the National Bureau of Economic Research.

The health economics literature contains two models of selection, one with endogenous plan characteristics to attract good risks and one with fixed plan characteristics; neither model contains a regulator. Medicare Advantage, a principal example of selection in the literature, is, however, subject to anti-selection regulations. Because selection causes economic inefficiency and because the historically favorable selection into Medicare Advantage plans increased government cost, the effectiveness of the anti-selection regulations is an important policy question, especially since the Medicare Advantage program has grown to comprise 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries. Read More

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/AJHE_a_00001DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4572504PMC
January 2015
13 Reads
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