Publications by authors named "Daniel B Jernigan"

59 Publications

Preparing for the 2020-2021 Influenza Season.

JAMA 2020 12;324(22):2318-2319

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.21849DOI Listing
December 2020

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices - United States, 2020-21 Influenza Season.

MMWR Recomm Rep 2020 08 21;69(8):1-24. Epub 2020 Aug 21.

This report updates the 2019-20 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines in the United States (MMWR Recomm Rep 2019;68[No. RR-3]). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. For each recipient, a licensed and age-appropriate vaccine should be used. Inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs), recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV4), and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) are expected to be available. Most influenza vaccines available for the 2020-21 season will be quadrivalent, with the exception of MF59-adjuvanted IIV, which is expected to be available in both quadrivalent and trivalent formulations.Updates to the recommendations described in this report reflect discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 23, 2019; February 26, 2020; and June 24, 2020. Primary updates to this report include the following two items. First, the composition of 2020-21 U.S. influenza vaccines includes updates to the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, influenza A(H3N2), and influenza B/Victoria lineage components. Second, recent licensures of two new influenza vaccines, Fluzone High-Dose Quadrivalent and Fluad Quadrivalent, are discussed. Both new vaccines are licensed for persons aged ≥65 years. Additional changes include updated discussion of contraindications and precautions to influenza vaccination and the accompanying Table, updated discussion concerning use of LAIV4 in the setting of influenza antiviral medication use, and updated recommendations concerning vaccination of persons with egg allergy who receive either cell culture-based IIV4 (ccIIV4) or RIV4.The 2020-21 influenza season will coincide with the continued or recurrent circulation of SARS-CoV-2 (the novel coronavirus associated with coronavirus disease 2019 [COVID-19]). Influenza vaccination of persons aged ≥6 months to reduce prevalence of illness caused by influenza will reduce symptoms that might be confused with those of COVID-19. Prevention of and reduction in the severity of influenza illness and reduction of outpatient illnesses, hospitalizations, and intensive care unit admissions through influenza vaccination also could alleviate stress on the U.S. health care system. Guidance for vaccine planning during the pandemic is available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/pandemic-guidance/index.html.This report focuses on recommendations for the use of vaccines for the prevention and control of seasonal influenza during the 2020-21 season in the United States. A brief summary of the recommendations and a link to the most recent Background Document containing additional information are available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/flu.html. These recommendations apply to U.S.-licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-licensed indications. Updates and other information are available from CDC's influenza website (https://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check this site periodically for additional information.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.rr6908a1DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7439976PMC
August 2020

Fifty Years of Influenza A(H3N2) Following the Pandemic of 1968.

Am J Public Health 2020 05;110(5):669-676

Barbara J. Jester (formerly Battelle contractor), Timothy M. Uyeki, and Daniel B. Jernigan are with the Influenza Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA.

In 2018, the world commemorated the centennial of the 1918 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic, the deadliest pandemic in recorded history; however, little mention was made of the 50th anniversary of the 1968 A(H3N2) pandemic. Although pandemic morbidity and mortality were much lower in 1968 than in 1918, influenza A(H3N2) virus infections have become the leading cause of seasonal influenza illness and death over the last 50 years, with more than twice the number of hospitalizations from A(H3N2) as from A(H1N1) during the past six seasons. We review the emergence, progression, clinical course, etiology, epidemiology, and treatment of the 1968 pandemic and highlight the short- and long-term impact associated with A(H3N2) viruses. The 1968 H3N2 pandemic and its ongoing sequelae underscore the need for improved seasonal and pandemic influenza prevention, control, preparedness, and response efforts.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2019.305557DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7144439PMC
May 2020

Update: Public Health Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Outbreak - United States, February 24, 2020.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 Feb 28;69(8):216-219. Epub 2020 Feb 28.

CDC COVID-19 Response Team, CDC.

An outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by the 2019 novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) began in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China in December 2019, and has spread throughout China and to 31 other countries and territories, including the United States (1). As of February 23, 2020, there were 76,936 reported cases in mainland China and 1,875 cases in locations outside mainland China (1). There have been 2,462 associated deaths worldwide; no deaths have been reported in the United States. Fourteen cases have been diagnosed in the United States, and an additional 39 cases have occurred among repatriated persons from high-risk settings, for a current total of 53 cases within the United States. This report summarizes the aggressive measures (2,3) that CDC, state and local health departments, multiple other federal agencies, and other partners are implementing to slow and try to contain transmission of COVID-19 in the United States. These measures require the identification of cases and contacts of persons with COVID-19 in the United States and the recommended assessment, monitoring, and care of travelers arriving from areas with substantial COVID-19 transmission. Although these measures might not prevent widespread transmission of the virus in the United States, they are being implemented to 1) slow the spread of illness; 2) provide time to better prepare state and local health departments, health care systems, businesses, educational organizations, and the general public in the event that widespread transmission occurs; and 3) better characterize COVID-19 to guide public health recommendations and the development and deployment of medical countermeasures, including diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. U.S. public health authorities are monitoring the situation closely, and CDC is coordinating efforts with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other global partners. Interim guidance is available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/index.html. As more is learned about this novel virus and this outbreak, CDC will rapidly incorporate new knowledge into guidance for action by CDC, state and local health departments, health care providers, and communities.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6908e1DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7367075PMC
February 2020

Initial Public Health Response and Interim Clinical Guidance for the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Outbreak - United States, December 31, 2019-February 4, 2020.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2020 Feb 7;69(5):140-146. Epub 2020 Feb 7.

Incident Manager, 2019-nCoV CDC Response, CDC.

On December 31, 2019, Chinese health officials reported a cluster of cases of acute respiratory illness in persons associated with the Hunan seafood and animal market in the city of Wuhan, Hubei Province, in central China. On January 7, 2020, Chinese health officials confirmed that a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) was associated with this initial cluster (1). As of February 4, 2020, a total of 20,471 confirmed cases, including 2,788 (13.6%) with severe illness,* and 425 deaths (2.1%) had been reported by the National Health Commission of China (2). Cases have also been reported in 26 locations outside of mainland China, including documentation of some person-to-person transmission and one death (2). As of February 4, 11 cases had been reported in the United States. On January 30, the World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General declared that the 2019-nCoV outbreak constitutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern. On January 31, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary declared a U.S. public health emergency to respond to 2019-nCoV. Also on January 31, the president of the United States signed a "Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons who Pose a Risk of Transmitting 2019 Novel Coronavirus," which limits entry into the United States of persons who traveled to mainland China to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents and their families (3). CDC, multiple other federal agencies, state and local health departments, and other partners are implementing aggressive measures to slow transmission of 2019-nCoV in the United States (4,5). These measures require the identification of cases and their contacts in the United States and the appropriate assessment and care of travelers arriving from mainland China to the United States. These measures are being implemented in anticipation of additional 2019-nCoV cases in the United States. Although these measures might not prevent the eventual establishment of ongoing, widespread transmission of the virus in the United States, they are being implemented to 1) slow the spread of illness; 2) provide time to better prepare health care systems and the general public to be ready if widespread transmission with substantial associated illness occurs; and 3) better characterize 2019-nCoV infection to guide public health recommendations and the development of medical countermeasures including diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. Public health authorities are monitoring the situation closely. As more is learned about this novel virus and this outbreak, CDC will rapidly incorporate new knowledge into guidance for action by CDC and state and local health departments.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6905e1DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7004396PMC
February 2020

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices - United States, 2019-20 Influenza Season.

MMWR Recomm Rep 2019 08 23;68(3):1-21. Epub 2019 Aug 23.

This report updates the 2018-19 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines in the United States (MMWR Recomm Rep 2018;67[No. RR-3]). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. A licensed, recommended, and age-appropriate vaccine should be used. Inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs), recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV), and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) are expected to be available for the 2019-20 season. Standard-dose, unadjuvanted, inactivated influenza vaccines will be available in quadrivalent formulations (IIV4s). High-dose (HD-IIV3) and adjuvanted (aIIV3) inactivated influenza vaccines will be available in trivalent formulations. Recombinant (RIV4) and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) will be available in quadrivalent formulations.Updates to the recommendations described in this report reflect discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 25, 2018; February 27, 2019; and June 27, 2019. Primary updates in this report include the following two items. First, 2019-20 U.S. trivalent influenza vaccines will contain hemagglutinin (HA) derived from an A/Brisbane/02/2018 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus, an A/Kansas/14/2017 (H3N2)-like virus, and a B/Colorado/06/2017-like virus (Victoria lineage). Quadrivalent influenza vaccines will contain HA derived from these three viruses, and a B/Phuket/3073/2013-like virus (Yamagata lineage). Second, recent labeling changes for two IIV4s, Afluria Quadrivalent and Fluzone Quadrivalent, are discussed. The age indication for Afluria Quadrivalent has been expanded from ≥5 years to ≥6 months. The dose volume for Afluria Quadrivalent is 0.25 mL for children aged 6 through 35 months and 0.5 mL for all persons aged ≥36 months (≥3 years). The dose volume for Fluzone Quadrivalent for children aged 6 through 35 months, which was previously 0.25 mL, is now either 0.25 mL or 0.5 mL. The dose volume for Fluzone Quadrivalent is 0.5 mL for all persons aged ≥36 months (≥3 years).This report focuses on the recommendations for use of vaccines for the prevention and control of influenza during the 2019-20 season in the United States. A brief summary of these recommendations and a Background Document containing additional information are available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/flu.html. These recommendations apply to U.S.-licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration-licensed indications. Updates and other information are available from CDC's influenza website (https://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check this site periodically for additional information.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.rr6803a1DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6713402PMC
August 2019

Historical and clinical aspects of the 1918 H1N1 pandemic in the United States.

Virology 2019 01 16;527:32-37. Epub 2018 Nov 16.

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States. Electronic address:

One hundred years have passed since the 1918 influenza pandemic caused substantial illness globally, with an estimated 50 million deaths. A number of factors, including World War I, contributed to the spread of the pandemic virus, which often caused high symptomatic attack rates and severe illness. Major achievements over the last 100 years have been made in influenza prevention, diagnosis, and treatment; however, the potential for a severe pandemic to emerge remains unchanged. We provide a review of the historical context and clinical aspects of illness due to the influenza A(H1N1) virus as it emerged and spread in 1918, with a focus on the experience in the United States. Understanding the significant social disruption and burden of illness from the 1918 pandemic can help us imagine the possible impacts of a high severity pandemic if it were to emerge now.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.virol.2018.10.019DOI Listing
January 2019

100 Years of Medical Countermeasures and Pandemic Influenza Preparedness.

Am J Public Health 2018 11 25;108(11):1469-1472. Epub 2018 Sep 25.

Barbara J. Jester is a Battelle contractor working for the Influenza Division at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, GA. Timothy M. Uyeki is chief medical officer for the Influenza Division at CDC. Anita Patel is the medical care and countermeasures team lead for the Influenza Coordination Unit at CDC. Lisa Koonin is deputy director of the Influenza Coordination Unit at CDC. Daniel B. Jernigan is director of the Influenza Division at CDC.

The 1918 influenza pandemic spread rapidly around the globe, leading to high mortality and social disruption. The countermeasures available to mitigate the pandemic were limited and relied on nonpharmaceutical interventions. Over the past 100 years, improvements in medical care, influenza vaccines, antiviral medications, community mitigation efforts, diagnosis, and communications have improved pandemic response. A number of gaps remain, including vaccines that are more rapidly manufactured, antiviral drugs that are more effective and available, and better respiratory protective devices.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304586DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6187768PMC
November 2018

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices-United States, 2018-19 Influenza Season.

MMWR Recomm Rep 2018 08 24;67(3):1-20. Epub 2018 Aug 24.

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.

This report updates the 2017-18 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines in the United States (MMWR Recomm Rep 2017;66[No. RR-2]). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. A licensed, recommended, and age-appropriate vaccine should be used. Inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs), recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV), and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) are expected to be available for the 2018-19 season. Standard-dose, unadjuvanted, inactivated influenza vaccines will be available in quadrivalent (IIV4) and trivalent (IIV3) formulations. Recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV4) and live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) will be available in quadrivalent formulations. High-dose inactivated influenza vaccine (HD-IIV3) and adjuvanted inactivated influenza vaccine (aIIV3) will be available in trivalent formulations.Updates to the recommendations described in this report reflect discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 25, 2017; February 21, 2018; and June 20, 2018. New and updated information in this report includes the following four items. First, vaccine viruses included in the 2018-19 U.S. trivalent influenza vaccines will be an A/Michigan/45/2015 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus, an A/Singapore/INFIMH-16-0019/2016 (H3N2)-like virus, and a B/Colorado/06/2017-like virus (Victoria lineage). Quadrivalent influenza vaccines will contain these three viruses and an additional influenza B vaccine virus, a B/Phuket/3073/2013-like virus (Yamagata lineage). Second, recommendations for the use of LAIV4 (FluMist Quadrivalent) have been updated. Following two seasons (2016-17 and 2017-18) during which ACIP recommended that LAIV4 not be used, for the 2018-19 season, vaccination providers may choose to administer any licensed, age-appropriate influenza vaccine (IIV, RIV4, or LAIV4). LAIV4 is an option for those for whom it is appropriate. Third, persons with a history of egg allergy of any severity may receive any licensed, recommended, and age-appropriate influenza vaccine (IIV, RIV4, or LAIV4). Additional recommendations concerning vaccination of egg-allergic persons are discussed. Finally, information on recent licensures and labeling changes is discussed, including expansion of the age indication for Afluria Quadrivalent (IIV4) from ≥18 years to ≥5 years and expansion of the age indication for Fluarix Quadrivalent (IIV4), previously licensed for ≥3 years, to ≥6 months.This report focuses on the recommendations for use of vaccines for the prevention and control of influenza during the 2018-19 season in the United States. A Background Document containing further information and a brief summary of these recommendations are available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/flu.html.These recommendations apply to U.S.-licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration-licensed indications. Updates and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (https://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check CDC's influenza website periodically for additional information.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.rr6703a1DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6107316PMC
August 2018

Progress in Vaccine-Preventable and Respiratory Infectious Diseases-First 10 Years of the CDC National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, 2006-2015.

Emerg Infect Dis 2018 07;24(7):1178-1187

The need for closer linkages between scientific and programmatic areas focused on addressing vaccine-preventable and acute respiratory infections led to establishment of the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. During its first 10 years (2006-2015), NCIRD worked with partners to improve preparedness and response to pandemic influenza and other emergent respiratory infections, provide an evidence base for addition of 7 newly recommended vaccines, and modernize vaccine distribution. Clinical tools were developed for improved conversations with parents, which helped sustain childhood immunization as a social norm. Coverage increased for vaccines to protect adolescents against pertussis, meningococcal meningitis, and human papillomavirus-associated cancers. NCIRD programs supported outbreak response for new respiratory pathogens and oversaw response of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to the 2009 influenza A(H1N1) pandemic. Other national public health institutes might also find closer linkages between epidemiology, laboratory, and immunization programs useful.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid2407.171699DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6038744PMC
July 2018

Update: ACIP Recommendations for the Use of Quadrivalent Live Attenuated Influenza Vaccine (LAIV4) - United States, 2018-19 Influenza Season.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2018 Jun 8;67(22):643-645. Epub 2018 Jun 8.

Intranasally administered live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) was initially licensed in the United States in 2003 as a trivalent formulation (LAIV3) (FluMist, MedImmune, LLC). Quadrivalent live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) (FluMist Quadrivalent, MedImmune) has been licensed in the United States since 2012 and was first available during the 2013-14 influenza season, replacing LAIV3. During the 2016-17 and 2017-18 influenza seasons, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommended that LAIV4 not be used because of concerns about low effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09-like viruses circulating in the United States during the 2013-14 and 2015-16 seasons (1,2). On February 21, 2018, ACIP recommended that LAIV4 be an option for influenza vaccination of persons for whom it is appropriate for the 2018-19 season (3). This document provides an overview of the information discussed in the decision-making process leading to this recommendation. A description of methodology and data reviewed will be included in the background materials that will supplement the 2018-19 ACIP Influenza Recommendations, which will replace the 2017-18 ACIP influenza statement (2), and which will also contain guidance for the use of LAIV4.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6722a5DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5991811PMC
June 2018

Systematic Assessment of Multiple Routine and Near Real-Time Indicators to Classify the Severity of Influenza Seasons and Pandemics in the United States, 2003-2004 Through 2015-2016.

Am J Epidemiol 2018 05;187(5):1040-1050

Epidemiology and Prevention Branch, Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia.

Assessments of influenza season severity can guide public health action. We used the moving epidemic method to develop intensity thresholds (ITs) for 3 US surveillance indicators from the 2003-2004 through 2014-2015 influenza seasons (excluding the 2009 pandemic). The indicators were: 1) outpatient visits for influenza-like illness; 2) influenza-related hospitalizations; and 3) influenza- and pneumonia-related deaths. ITs were developed for the population overall and separately for children, adults, and older adults, and they were set at the upper limit of the 50% (IT50), 90% (IT90), and 98% (IT98) 1-sided confidence intervals of the geometric mean of each season's 3 highest values. Severity was classified as low if ≥2 systems peaked below IT50, moderate if ≥2 peaked between IT50 and IT90, high if ≥2 peaked between IT90 and IT98, and very high if ≥2 peaked above IT98. We pilot-tested this method with the 2015-2016 season and the 2009 pandemic. Overall, 4 seasons were classified as low severity, 7 as moderate, 2 as high, and none as very high. Among the age groups, older adults had the most seasons (n = 3) classified as high, and children were the only group to have seasons (n = 2) classified as very high. We will apply this method to classify the severity of future seasons and inform pandemic response.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwx334DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5908755PMC
May 2018

The Global Threat of Animal Influenza Viruses of Zoonotic Concern: Then and Now.

J Infect Dis 2017 09;216(suppl_4):S493-S498

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases.

Animal influenza viruses can reassort or mutate to infect and spread sustainably among people and cause a devastating worldwide pandemic. Since the first evidence of human infection with an animal influenza virus, in 1958, 16 different novel, zoonotic influenza A virus subtype groups in 29 countries, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have caused human infections, with differing severity and frequency. The frequency of novel influenza virus detection is increasing, and human infections with influenza A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) viruses are now annual seasonal occurrences in Asia. The study of the epidemiology and virology of animal influenza viruses is key to understanding pandemic risk and informing preparedness. This supplement brings together select recent articles that look at the risk of emergence and transmission of and approaches to prevent novel influenza virus infections.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/infdis/jix331DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7313897PMC
September 2017

Update: Increase in Human Infections with Novel Asian Lineage Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Viruses During the Fifth Epidemic - China, October 1, 2016-August 7, 2017.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2017 Sep 8;66(35):928-932. Epub 2017 Sep 8.

Among all influenza viruses assessed using CDC's Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT), the Asian lineage avian influenza A(H7N9) virus (Asian H7N9), first reported in China in March 2013,* is ranked as the influenza virus with the highest potential pandemic risk (1). During October 1, 2016-August 7, 2017, the National Health and Family Planning Commission of China; CDC, Taiwan; the Hong Kong Centre for Health Protection; and the Macao CDC reported 759 human infections with Asian H7N9 viruses, including 281 deaths, to the World Health Organization (WHO), making this the largest of the five epidemics of Asian H7N9 infections that have occurred since 2013 (Figure 1). This report summarizes new viral and epidemiologic features identified during the fifth epidemic of Asian H7N9 in China and summarizes ongoing measures to enhance pandemic preparedness. Infections in humans and poultry were reported from most areas of China, including provinces bordering other countries, indicating extensive, ongoing geographic spread. The risk to the general public is very low and most human infections were, and continue to be, associated with poultry exposure, especially at live bird markets in mainland China. Throughout the first four epidemics of Asian H7N9 infections, only low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses were detected among human, poultry, and environmental specimens and samples. During the fifth epidemic, mutations were detected among some Asian H7N9 viruses, identifying the emergence of high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses as well as viruses with reduced susceptibility to influenza antiviral medications recommended for treatment. Furthermore, the fifth-epidemic viruses diverged genetically into two separate lineages (Pearl River Delta lineage and Yangtze River Delta lineage), with Yangtze River Delta lineage viruses emerging as antigenically different compared with those from earlier epidemics. Because of its pandemic potential, candidate vaccine viruses (CVV) were produced in 2013 that have been used to make vaccines against Asian H7N9 viruses circulating at that time. CDC is working with partners to enhance surveillance for Asian H7N9 viruses in humans and poultry, to improve laboratory capability to detect and characterize H7N9 viruses, and to develop, test and distribute new CVV that could be used for vaccine production if a vaccine is needed.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6635a2DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5689040PMC
September 2017

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices - United States, 2017-18 Influenza Season.

MMWR Recomm Rep 2017 08 25;66(2):1-20. Epub 2017 Aug 25.

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.

This report updates the 2016-17 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines (MMWR Recomm Rep 2016;65[No. RR-5]). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. A licensed, recommended, and age-appropriate vaccine should be used.For the 2017-18 season, quadrivalent and trivalent influenza vaccines will be available. Inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs) will be available in trivalent (IIV3) and quadrivalent (IIV4) formulations. Recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV) will be available in trivalent (RIV3) and quadrivalent (RIV4) formulations. Live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) is not recommended for use during the 2017-18 season due to concerns about its effectiveness against (H1N1)pdm09 viruses during the 2013-14 and 2015-16 seasons. Recommendations for different vaccine types and specific populations are discussed. No preferential recommendation is made for one influenza vaccine product over another for persons for whom more than one licensed, recommended product is available.Updates to the recommendations described in this report reflect discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 20, 2016; February 22, 2017; and June 21, 2017. New and updated information in this report includes the following:•Vaccine viruses included in the 2017-18 U.S. trivalent influenza vaccines will be an A/Michigan/45/2015 (H1N1)pdm09-like virus, an A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 (H3N2)-like virus, and a B/Brisbane/60/2008-like virus (Victoria lineage). Quadrivalent influenza vaccines will contain these three viruses and an additional influenza B vaccine virus, a B/Phuket/3073/2013-like virus (Yamagata lineage).• Information on recent licensures and labelling changes is discussed, including licensure of Afluria Quadrivalent (IIV4; Seqirus, Parkville, Victoria, Australia); Flublok Quadrivalent (RIV4; Protein Sciences, Meriden, Connecticut); and expansion of the age indication for FluLaval Quadrivalent (IIV4; ID Biomedical Corporation of Quebec, Quebec City, Quebec, Canada), previously licensed for ≥3 years, to ≥6 months.• Pregnant women may receive any licensed, recommended, age-appropriate influenza vaccine.• Afluria (IIV3; Seqirus, Parkville, Victoria, Australia) may be used for persons aged ≥5 years, consistent with Food and Drug Administration-approved labeling.• FluMist Quadrivalent (LAIV4; MedImmune, Gaithersburg, Maryland) should not be used during the 2017-18 season due to concerns about its effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses in the United States during the 2013-14 and 2015-16 influenza seasons.This report focuses on the recommendations for use of vaccines for the prevention and control of influenza during the 2017-18 season in the United States. A Background Document containing further information and a summary of these recommendations are available at https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-specific/flu.html. These recommendations apply to licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration-licensed indications, including those licensed after the publication date of this report. Updates and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (https://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check CDC's influenza website periodically for additional information.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.rr6602a1DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5837399PMC
August 2017

Novel influenza A viruses and pandemic threats.

Lancet 2017 Jun;389(10085):2172-2174

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329-4027, USA.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31274-6DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6637738PMC
June 2017

Stockpiled pre-pandemic H5N1 influenza virus vaccines with AS03 adjuvant provide cross-protection from H5N2 clade 2.3.4.4 virus challenge in ferrets.

Virology 2017 08 26;508:164-169. Epub 2017 May 26.

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States. Electronic address:

Avian influenza viruses, notably H5 subtype viruses, pose a continuous threat to public health due to their pandemic potential. In recent years, influenza virus H5 subtype split vaccines with novel oil-in-water emulsion based adjuvants (e.g. AS03, MF59) have been shown to be safe, immunogenic, and able to induce broad immune responses in clinical trials, providing strong scientific support for vaccine stockpiling. However, whether such vaccines can provide protection from infection with emerging, antigenically distinct clades of H5 viruses has not been adequately addressed. Here, we selected two AS03-adjuvanted H5N1 vaccines from the US national pre-pandemic influenza vaccine stockpile and assessed whether the 2004-05 vaccines could provide protection against a 2014 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N2 virus (A/northern pintail/Washington/40964/2014), a clade 2.3.4.4 virus responsible for mass culling of poultry in North America. Ferrets received two doses of adjuvanted vaccine containing 7.5µg of hemagglutinin (HA) from A/Vietnam/1203/2004 (clade 1) or A/Anhui/1/2005 (clade 2.3.4) virus either in a homologous or heterologous prime-boost vaccination regime. We found that both vaccination regimens elicited robust antibody responses against the 2004-05 vaccine viruses and could reduce virus-induced morbidity and viral replication in the lower respiratory tract upon heterologous challenge despite the low level of cross-reactive antibody titers to the challenge H5N2 virus. This study supports the value of existing stockpiled 2004-05 influenza H5N1 vaccines, combined with AS03-adjuvant for early use in the event of an emerging pandemic with H5N2-like clade 2.3.4.4 viruses.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.virol.2017.05.010DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5788307PMC
August 2017

Increase in Human Infections with Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus During the Fifth Epidemic - China, October 2016-February 2017.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2017 Mar 10;66(9):254-255. Epub 2017 Mar 10.

During March 2013-February 24, 2017, annual epidemics of avian influenza A(H7N9) in China resulted in 1,258 avian influenza A(H7N9) virus infections in humans being reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) by the National Health and Family Planning Commission of China and other regional sources (1). During the first four epidemics, 88% of patients developed pneumonia, 68% were admitted to an intensive care unit, and 41% died (2). Candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) were developed, and vaccine was manufactured based on representative viruses detected after the emergence of A(H7N9) virus in humans in 2013. During the ongoing fifth epidemic (beginning October 1, 2016),* 460 human infections with A(H7N9) virus have been reported, including 453 in mainland China, six associated with travel to mainland China from Hong Kong (four cases), Macao (one) and Taiwan (one), and one in an asymptomatic poultry worker in Macao (1). Although the clinical characteristics and risk factors for human infections do not appear to have changed (2,3), the reported human infections during the fifth epidemic represent a significant increase compared with the first four epidemics, which resulted in 135 (first epidemic), 320 (second), 226 (third), and 119 (fourth epidemic) human infections (2). Most human infections continue to result in severe respiratory illness and have been associated with poultry exposure. Although some limited human-to-human spread continues to be identified, no sustained human-to-human A(H7N9) transmission has been observed (2,3).
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6609e2DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5687196PMC
March 2017

Evaluation of multiplex assay platforms for detection of influenza hemagglutinin subtype specific antibody responses.

J Virol Methods 2017 05 17;243:61-67. Epub 2017 Jan 17.

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30329-4027 USA.

Influenza hemagglutination inhibition (HI) and virus microneutralization assays (MN) are widely used for seroprevalence studies. However, these assays have limited field portability and are difficult to fully automate for high throughput laboratory testing. To address these issues, three multiplex influenza subtype-specific antibody detection assays were developed using recombinant hemagglutinin antigens in combination with Chembio, Luminex, and ForteBio platforms. Assay sensitivity, specificity, and subtype cross-reactivity were evaluated using a panel of well characterized human sera. Compared to the traditional HI, assay sensitivity ranged from 87% to 92% and assay specificity in sera collected from unexposed persons ranged from 65% to 100% across the platforms. High assay specificity (86-100%) for A(H5N1) rHA was achieved for sera from exposed or unexposed to hetorosubtype influenza HAs. In contrast, assay specificity for A(H1N1)pdm09 rHA using sera collected from A/Vietnam/1204/2004 (H5N1) vaccinees in 2008 was low (22-30%) in all platforms. Although cross-reactivity against rHA subtype proteins was observed in each assay platform, the correct subtype specific responses were identified 78%-94% of the time when paired samples were available for analysis. These results show that high throughput and portable multiplex assays that incorporate rHA can be used to identify influenza subtype specific infections.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jviromet.2017.01.008DOI Listing
May 2017

CDC Grand Rounds: Modeling and Public Health Decision-Making.

MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2016 Dec 9;65(48):1374-1377. Epub 2016 Dec 9.

Mathematical models incorporate various data sources and advanced computational techniques to portray real-world disease transmission and translate the basic science of infectious diseases into decision-support tools for public health. Unlike standard epidemiologic methods that rely on complete data, modeling is needed when there are gaps in data. By combining diverse data sources, models can fill gaps when critical decisions must be made using incomplete or limited information. They can be used to assess the effect and feasibility of different scenarios and provide insight into the emergence, spread, and control of disease. During the past decade, models have been used to predict the likelihood and magnitude of infectious disease outbreaks, inform emergency response activities in real time (1), and develop plans and preparedness strategies for future events, the latter of which proved invaluable during outbreaks such as severe acute respiratory syndrome and pandemic influenza (2-6). Ideally, modeling is a multistep process that involves communication between modelers and decision-makers, allowing them to gain a mutual understanding of the problem to be addressed, the type of estimates that can be reliably generated, and the limitations of the data. As models become more detailed and relevant to real-time threats, the importance of modeling in public health decision-making continues to grow.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6548a4DOI Listing
December 2016

Prevention and Control of Seasonal Influenza with Vaccines.

MMWR Recomm Rep 2016 Aug 26;65(5):1-54. Epub 2016 Aug 26.

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, CDC.

This report updates the 2015-16 recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) regarding the use of seasonal influenza vaccines (Grohskopf LA, Sokolow LZ, Olsen SJ, Bresee JS, Broder KR, Karron RA. Prevention and control of influenza with vaccines: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, United States, 2015-16 influenza season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2015;64:818-25). Routine annual influenza vaccination is recommended for all persons aged ≥6 months who do not have contraindications. For the 2016-17 influenza season, inactivated influenza vaccines (IIVs) will be available in both trivalent (IIV3) and quadrivalent (IIV4) formulations. Recombinant influenza vaccine (RIV) will be available in a trivalent formulation (RIV3). In light of concerns regarding low effectiveness against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in the United States during the 2013-14 and 2015-16 seasons, for the 2016-17 season, ACIP makes the interim recommendation that live attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV4) should not be used. Vaccine virus strains included in the 2016-17 U.S. trivalent influenza vaccines will be an A/California/7/2009 (H1N1)-like virus, an A/Hong Kong/4801/2014 (H3N2)-like virus, and a B/Brisbane/60/2008-like virus (Victoria lineage). Quadrivalent vaccines will include an additional influenza B virus strain, a B/Phuket/3073/2013-like virus (Yamagata lineage).Recommendations for use of different vaccine types and specific populations are discussed. A licensed, age-appropriate vaccine should be used. No preferential recommendation is made for one influenza vaccine product over another for persons for whom more than one licensed, recommended product is otherwise appropriate. This information is intended for vaccination providers, immunization program personnel, and public health personnel. Information in this report reflects discussions during public meetings of ACIP held on October 21, 2015; February 24, 2016; and June 22, 2016. These recommendations apply to all licensed influenza vaccines used within Food and Drug Administration-licensed indications, including those licensed after the publication date of this report. Updates and other information are available at CDC's influenza website (http://www.cdc.gov/flu). Vaccination and health care providers should check CDC's influenza website periodically for additional information.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.rr6505a1DOI Listing
August 2016

Overview, Control Strategies, and Lessons Learned in the CDC Response to the 2014-2016 Ebola Epidemic.

MMWR Suppl 2016 Jul 8;65(3):4-11. Epub 2016 Jul 8.

Office of the Director, National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC.

During 2014-2016, CDC, working with U.S. and international partners, mounted a concerted response to end the unprecedented epidemic of Ebola virus disease (Ebola) in West Africa. CDC's response, which was the largest in the agency's history, was directed simultaneously at controlling the epidemic in West Africa and strengthening preparedness for Ebola in the United States. Although experience in responding to approximately 20 Ebola outbreaks since 1976 had provided CDC and other international responders an understanding of the disease and how to stop its spread, the epidemic in West Africa presented new and formidable challenges. The initial response was slow and complicated for several reasons, including wide geographic spread of cases, poor public health and societal infrastructure, sociodemographic factors, local unfamiliarity with Ebola, and distrust of government and health care workers. In the United States, widespread public alarm erupted after Ebola cases were diagnosed in Dallas, Texas, and New York City, New York. CDC, in collaboration with its U.S. and international counterparts, applied proven public health strategies as well as innovative new approaches to help control the Ebola epidemic in West Africa and strengthen public health readiness in the United States. Lessons learned include the recognition that West African and other countries need effective systems to detect and stop infectious disease threats, the need for stronger international surge capacity for times when countries are overwhelmed by an outbreak, and the importance of improving infection prevention and control in health care settings. The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).
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http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.su6503a2DOI Listing
July 2016

H7N9: preparing for the unexpected in influenza.

Annu Rev Med 2015 29;66:361-71. Epub 2014 Oct 29.

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Disease, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia 30329; email: ,

In the years prior to 2013, avian influenza A H7 viruses were a cause of significant poultry mortality; however, human illness was generally mild. In March 2013, a novel influenza A(H7N9) virus emerged in China as an unexpected cause of severe human illness with 36% mortality. Chinese and other public health officials responded quickly, characterizing the virus and identifying more than 400 cases through use of new technologies and surveillance tools made possible by past preparedness and response efforts. Genetic sequencing, glycan-array receptor-binding assays, and ferret studies reveal the H7N9 virus to have increased binding to mammalian respiratory cells and to have mutations associated with higher virus replication rates and illness severity. New risk-assessment tools indicate H7N9 has the potential for further mammalian adaptation with possible human-to-human transmission. Vigilant virologic and epidemiologic surveillance is needed to monitor H7N9 and detect other unexpected novel influenza viruses that may emerge.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-med-010714-112311DOI Listing
September 2015

Updated preparedness and response framework for influenza pandemics.

MMWR Recomm Rep 2014 Sep;63(RR-06):1-18

The complexities of planning for and responding to the emergence of novel influenza viruses emphasize the need for systematic frameworks to describe the progression of the event; weigh the risk of emergence and potential public health impact; evaluate transmissibility, antiviral resistance, and severity; and make decisions about interventions. On the basis of experience from recent influenza responses, CDC has updated its framework to describe influenza pandemic progression using six intervals (two prepandemic and four pandemic intervals) and eight domains. This updated framework can be used for influenza pandemic planning and serves as recommendations for risk assessment, decision-making, and action in the United States. The updated framework replaces the U.S. federal government stages from the 2006 implementation plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (US Homeland Security Council. National strategy for pandemic influenza: implementation plan. Washington, DC: US Homeland Security Council; 2006. Available at http://www.flu.gov/planning-preparedness/federal/pandemic-influenza-implementation.pdf). The six intervals of the updated framework are as follows: 1) investigation of cases of novel influenza, 2) recognition of increased potential for ongoing transmission, 3) initiation of a pandemic wave, 4) acceleration of a pandemic wave, 5) deceleration of a pandemic wave, and 6) preparation for future pandemic waves. The following eight domains are used to organize response efforts within each interval: incident management, surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory, community mitigation, medical care and countermeasures, vaccine, risk communications, and state/local coordination. Compared with the previous U.S. government stages, this updated framework provides greater detail and clarity regarding the potential timing of key decisions and actions aimed at slowing the spread and mitigating the impact of an emerging pandemic. Use of this updated framework is anticipated to improve pandemic preparedness and response in the United States. Activities and decisions during a response are event-specific. These intervals serve as a reference for public health decision-making by federal, state, and local health authorities in the United States during an influenza pandemic and are not meant to be prescriptive or comprehensive. This framework incorporates information from newly developed tools for pandemic planning and response, including the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool and the Pandemic Severity Assessment Framework, and has been aligned with the pandemic phases restructured in 2013 by the World Health Organization.
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September 2014

Response to Al-Husayni and Hassoun.

J Clin Virol 2014 Sep 2;61(1):176-7. Epub 2014 Jun 2.

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, United States.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcv.2014.05.016DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6669024PMC
September 2014

Rapid influenza diagnostic test use and antiviral prescriptions in outpatient settings pre- and post-2009 H1N1 pandemic.

J Clin Virol 2014 May 12;60(1):27-33. Epub 2014 Feb 12.

Office of Infectious Diseases, NCIRD, Influenza Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Road, Atlanta, GA 30333, United States.

Background: Rapid influenza diagnostic tests (RIDTs) can be used at the point-of-care and are often the only influenza tests readily available in outpatient facilities.

Objectives: To determine the use of RIDTs and antiviral prescription practices in outpatient facilities.

Study Design: Surveys were mailed to U.S. physician's offices, emergency departments, and community health centers in 2008 (pre-2009 H1N1 pandemic) and 2010 (post-2009 H1N1 pandemic). The 2010 survey included questions to evaluate changes in testing and treatment practices among various risk groups subsequent to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.

Results: In both surveys, respondents using RIDTs relied on RIDT results to guide prescribing antiviral medications. Greater than two-thirds of these respondents reported prescribing antiviral medications both pre- and post-pandemic for patients within 48h of onset of flu-like symptoms with a positive RIDT (69% pre-pandemic; 67% post-pandemic). After the pandemic (2010 survey), outpatient providers also reported prescribing antivirals to those with flu-like symptoms for 31% of children <2 years, 23% of children 2-5 years, 37% of pregnant patients, and 74% of other patients at high risk; while these figures were higher than pre-pandemic, they represent a failure to use CDC guidelines to prescribe antivirals for patients with suspected influenza who are at higher risk for complications.

Conclusions: Clinicians in outpatient facilities often relied on RIDT findings to aid in making antiviral treatment decisions; however their treatment practices were not always consistent with CDC guidelines. The use of RIDTs and antiviral medicines were influenced by the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcv.2014.01.016DOI Listing
May 2014

Human infections with influenza A(H3N2) variant virus in the United States, 2011-2012.

Clin Infect Dis 2013 Jul;57 Suppl 1:S4-S11

Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA.

BACKGROUND. During August 2011-April 2012, 13 human infections with influenza A(H3N2) variant (H3N2v) virus were identified in the United States; 8 occurred in the prior 2 years. This virus differs from previous variant influenza viruses in that it contains the matrix (M) gene from the Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic influenza virus. METHODS. A case was defined as a person with laboratory-confirmed H3N2v virus infection. Cases and contacts were interviewed to determine exposure to swine and other animals and to assess potential person-to-person transmission. RESULTS. Median age of cases was 4 years, and 12 of 13 (92%) were children. Pig exposure was identified in 7 (54%) cases. Six of 7 cases with swine exposure (86%) touched pigs, and 1 (14%) was close to pigs without known direct contact. Six cases had no swine exposure, including 2 clusters of suspected person-to-person transmission. All cases had fever; 12 (92%) had respiratory symptoms, and 3 (23%) were hospitalized for influenza. All 13 cases recovered. CONCLUSIONS. H3N2v virus infections were identified at a high rate from August 2011 to April 2012, and cases without swine exposure were identified in influenza-like illness outbreaks, indicating that limited person-to-person transmission likely occurred. Variant influenza viruses rarely result in sustained person-to-person transmission; however, the potential for this H3N2v virus to transmit efficiently is of concern. With minimal preexisting immunity in children and the limited cross-protective effect from seasonal influenza vaccine, the majority of children are susceptible to infection with this novel influenza virus.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cid/cit272DOI Listing
July 2013

Estimates of the number of human infections with influenza A(H3N2) variant virus, United States, August 2011-April 2012.

Clin Infect Dis 2013 Jul;57 Suppl 1:S12-5

Epidemiology and Prevention Branch, Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1600 Clifton Rd. NE, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA.

Background: Thirteen human infections with an influenza A(H3N2) variant (H3N2v) virus containing a combination of gene segments not previously associated with human illness were identified in the United States from August 2011 to April 2012. Because laboratory confirmation of influenza virus infection is only performed for a minority of ill persons and routine clinical tests may not identify H3N2v virus, the count of laboratory-confirmed H3N2v virus infections underestimates the true burden of illness.

Methods: To account for this underascertainment, we adapted a multiplier model created at the beginning of the influenza A(H1N1) 2009 pandemic to estimate the true burden of H3N2v illness. Data to inform each of these parameters came from the literature and from special projects conducted during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the 2010-2011 influenza season. The multipliers were calculated as the simple inverses of the proportions at each step, and we accounted for variability and uncertainty in model parameters by using a probabilistic or Monte Carlo approach.

Results: We estimate that the median multiplier for children was 200 (90% range, 115-369) and for adults was 255 (90% range, 152-479) and that 2055 (90% range, 1187-3800) illnesses from H3N2v virus infections may have occurred from August 2011 to April 2012, suggesting that the new virus was more widespread than previously thought.

Conclusions: Illness from this variant influenza virus was more frequent than previously thought. Continued surveillance is needed to ensure timely detection and response to H3N2v virus infections.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cid/cit273DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4603749PMC
July 2013

Progress in global surveillance and response capacity 10 years after severe acute respiratory syndrome.

Emerg Infect Dis 2013 Jun;19(6):864-9

Division of Foodborne, Waterborne and Environmental Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

Ten years have elapsed since the World Health Organization issued its first global alert for an unexplained illness named severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on the international response to this new global microbial threat. While global surveillance and response capacity for public health threats have been strengthened, critical gaps remain. Of 194 World Health Organization member states that signed on to the International Health Regulations (2005), <20% had achieved compliance with the core capacities required by the deadline in June 2012. Lessons learned from the global SARS outbreak highlight the need to avoid complacency, strengthen efforts to improve global capacity to address the next pandemic using all available 21st century tools, and support research to develop new treatment options, countermeasures, and insights while striving to address the global inequities that are the root cause of many of these challenges.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1906.130192DOI Listing
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3713843PMC
June 2013